

Mr. Raskin talks about the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. At first when we introduced the legislation, we called it a peace agency. However, the name peace agency had to be changed to gain support in Congress. Mr. Kowalski was one of the original sponsors of that bill back in 1961 and 1962.

Let us see what the Pentagon Papers show regarding the need for internal checks and balances. I think it is an important question.

ELLSBERG: I can't entirely agree with the present pre-occupation with the question of institutional change and of changing the relations between Congress and the Executive.

I think that is needed, obviously, and I think the Pentagon Papers are relevant to the kinds of changes that are needed, and I hope <sup>they</sup> will contribute over a matter of years to changes like that by showing the urgency and the detailed kind of changes necessary.

But, that won't end the war as quickly as it must be ended. Institutional change, which will take years, I think, can not be relied upon. Nor, in fact, can presidential electoral politics be relied on to end this war or involvement in the war before we have carried certain recent policies, as in Cambodia and Laos, to their implied conclusion and destroyed North Vietnam.

So, I have thought for some time that it was essential to address the shorter run question. How do we bring the war to an end before Americans have adopted that policy of destroying North Vietnam?

As I look around at the elements of our society that might end it and could end it, I have to focus on Congress. Moreover, I have to focus on individual Congressmen doing "unconventional" things.

THE PRESS: Dr. Ellsberg, while you were at it with the various interesting Pentagon Papers, if you had the Gulf of Tonkin incident study, why didn't you release that also?

ELLSBERG: I did not.

THE PRESS: You never did have access to that?

ELLSBERG: I did have access to it. In fact, in 1964, during a study under Walter Rostow, an inter-agency study of crisis decision-making, I was the only civilian outside of the Weapons System Evaluation Group of IDA, which had done these crisis studies, to be given official access. I spent part of that year reading all of the crisis studies that were done <sup>including</sup> ~~in-keeping~~ their command and control study.

That was a period when the Secretary of Defense did not have access to the study, nor did he have access to that study until Senator Fulbright asked him for it in 1968. His testimony in 1968 shows he commented quite <sup>correctly</sup> ~~directly~~ he had never heard of that study until a few days before Senator Fulbright had asked him for it. I am well aware he was telling the truth when he



said that.

THE PRESS: Having read the study, Dr. Ellsberg, what do you feel it tells us about the origin of the American escalation of the war?

ELLSBERG: The command and control study? It <sup>doesn't</sup> didn't add a lot. <sup>now</sup> Of course, when it was written it was in direct contradiction to many of the statements made by Secretary McNamara

before the Fulbright Committee and before Congress voted on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.

This is one of the things I thought Congressman Eckhardt might be interested in. He raised the question, where does one draw the line on what is released and what isn't released, and there is an assumption that the line could not possibly or responsibly be drawn more liberally than the Pentagon Papers released indicate.

Now nothing in those, of course, is more recent than <sup>three</sup> ~~two~~ years ago. I would question whether that is the standard that one must go by. I think that most Congressmen have indicated that they feel it would not be possible, under any circumstances, to demand or receive material, for instance, on covert operations at the time or recently afterwards or on current operations.

Now I would certainly dispute that. President Kennedy's comments to The New York Times in, I guess, 1962, the year after the Bay of Pigs, were that he wished they had revealed, at the time, the covert operation of the Bay of Pigs.

<sup>That</sup> ~~It~~ is a presidential judgment, a very reasonable one, that the public would have been better served if Congress had <sup>had</sup> ~~that~~ information. When you mentioned the command and control study, the information behind <sup>in</sup> that would have dealt with the so-called 34A operations against North Vietnam being conducted in the first half of 1964.

The fact that Congress was not told and indeed was entirely misled about the nature of those operations, played a crucial



role in manipulating Congress so as to get an appearance of support for a war about which, in fact, they had been grossly misled.

So, again, it would have been better for all of us had they had the information; which, in fact, Senator Morse appeared to have, but having it only by himself he was not able to convince his fellow Senators.

The information about covert operations in Laos in the past and now, information that Fred Branfman has brought to us, obviously is very long overdue. Finally, to get to the question of ongoing plans -- ongoing operations -- when will Congress decide that it has a need to know about the decision-making that went into the Cambodian invasion or the Laotian operation?

I put it as almost an exercise to people who have read these Papers or Congressmen who have access to the full set that one of the things they should strive to learn from them is a set of good hypotheses about how they are being misled, abused and manipulated today and in past years by studying how things like the Tonkin Gulf Resolution go through.

They should be able to make some good guesses as to what in went on/the process leading up to Cambodia or Laos. There is no question there was great deception in that process and I think it is time for Congressmen to decide that they have a right to know and a need to know. Indeed the public does deserve better

than leaked stories to Look Magazine of classified information from within the administration, ~~in a more comprehensive way.~~

They should have the memos, contingency plans and the estimates represented in the Pentagon Papers for those episodes. Finally, I think they should have some access, however limited, to the kinds of "contingency plans" that exist right now for the invasion of North Vietnam and the total bombing of North Vietnam.

HALPERIN: Let me say, I have never been in Vietnam. I don't speak Vietnamese and I don't purport to be an expert on Vietnam or Vietnamese society. I think there are two different notions of what the first priority is regarding the war.

It is clear that Vietnam has raised a number of very fundamental issues about the role of the United States in the world, about the nature of our interests in the world, about the degree to which we can ignore the rights and interests of other people to insure what has to be done for our own security, the questions about the morality of the war, the questions about the decision-making structures, the powers of Congress and so on.

What has disturbed me is not what some of the discussion is here but about some of the things that have been going on in the Congress. We seem to be turning our attention to what would seem to me quite legitimate post-war issues and post-war problems before we are out of Indochina.